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► To cite this version:

Vatsal Pant, Jean-Charles Chaudemar, Hamid Demmou. Safety Analysis of Pilot-System Interaction. 12e Conférence Internationale de Modélisation, Optimisation et Simulation (MOSIM), Jun 2018, Toulouse, France. 6p. hal-01828560

HAL Id: hal-01828560

<https://laas.hal.science/hal-01828560>

Submitted on 3 Jul 2018

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Safety Analysis of Pilot-System Interaction

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ABSTRACT: *This paper presents on-going work in the scope of development of a new methodology of safety analysis taking into account pilot's behavior. The initial part of the research deals with understanding pilot error and to model his behavior against required tasks. The paper presents the methodology and the tool developed for this purpose.*

KEYWORDS: *STAMP, STPA, MBSE, MBSA, Process Model, Flight Control, Safety*

1 INTRODUCTION

Flight travel has become safer and safer over the years thanks to the various state-of-the-art technologies used in design and development of the aircraft (Clinton V. Oster Jr. 2013). But, the human error as cause of accident still remains at the same ratio. It was shown in a research by 1 the cause of human error due to bad decision making amounts to around 25 percent (Wiegmann & Shappell 2011). Researchers are trying to study what more (or in some case - less) information should be given to the pilot in order to improve his decision making and reduce any chances of error. Our research has the same objective, i.e, to provide the pilot with information about what might go wrong based on the current situation he is in. For example, based on the descend trend at a particular instant, an automated analysis is performed and then the pilot is informed of the possible hazardous situation he might enter into. In this process, the time is of the utmost importance in order to perform a possible corrective maneuver. One of our objectives in this study is to develop a safety analysis method that takes into account pilot's task behavior. To do this a new hazard analysis technique developed in MIT, USA called STAMP-STPA has been used (Leveson 2011).

The paper presents this new hazard analysis process in the second section. Third section explains the methodology used to meet that objective. Fourth sections details about modeling the pilot task behavior, moving on to the fifth section where the use of ADS-B data in our project has been described. The following section introduces the tool developed for carrying out the aforementioned analysis. Some results and conclusions are presented at the end.

2 STAMP and STPA

This section defines the STAMP process model, the hazard analysis process based on STAMP called STPA, and a brief introduction to use STPA.

System Theoretic Accident Modeling Processes (STAMP) is a methodology used to model a system and/or a process. It is based on the concepts of Systems Engineering and Control Theory. The modeling is done on the base of functional structure rather than the physical component structure. The entire process is classified in different level of complexities starting from the most complex at the top and then going down to the least complex at the bottom. This complexity corresponds to the functions performed at each level. Each level has a controller and a process as shown in Figure 1. Each controller gives some control actions as input to the process and receives feedback from the process. (Thomas 2017)




Figure 1 – Control based STAMP model

According to this modeling, an associated definition of failure is proposed, thus failure is defined as loss

of control since the focus is on early functional architecture instead of physical one. The basic ideology is that there have been incidents in the past where neither components failed nor humans made error yet accidents occurred (Nancy Leveson & Marais 2003). Another useful concept in safety is the hazardous condition depicting the result of a failure in the STAMP framework.

Moreover, STAMP offers a collection of processes, including a System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), which is of interest for our study. STPA is a top-down method that makes use of a control structure. It is performed in following two steps (Leveson & Thomas 2013) :

- Define Accidents and Hazards (associated with these accidents) and obtain loss of control that can lead to a hazardous state
- Identify how these unsafe control actions could occur in the control structure.

Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) are the commands given by the controller to the process that can result in a hazardous situation. *UCA* is defined as:

$$Context + ControlAction + Hazard$$

Here, *Context* is defined as the scenario or condition or constraint that helps us in assigning safe or unsafe nature to a control action (Thomas 2013). For example, one can imagine that the pilot lowers the landing gear, this is a control action but it becomes an unsafe control action if it is lowered at a high speed and at a high altitude, as it increases the drag on the aircraft and it becomes even more critical if there is a critical situation like fuel starvation. This might result in stall. Hence it is very important to carefully consider the context.

According to STPA there are four types of possible unsafe control actions:

- Providing a control action will cause a hazard. In this case, the control action may be tagged as "inappropriate".
- Not providing a control action will cause a hazard. This is the absence of a required control action.
- Providing it too early/too late will cause a hazard. The focus is on the time at which a control action is provided.
- Providing it for too long or stopping it too soon will cause a hazard (this is more applicable when the input is continuous). The focus is on the duration of the control action.

Given these STAMP and STPA concepts, our study relates to an original approach enabling to extend STPA analysis for on-line safety analysis.

3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

This section defines the approach used in order to integrate the concept of unsafe control actions with safety analysis.

As aforementioned, the *UCA* concept becomes a central component of our methodology, which requires to formalize it. For that, a formal tabular specification (Russo, Miller, Nuseibeh & Kramer 2000) is used to define the unsafe control action uca_{ij} , such as for any i, j :

$$uca_{ij} = \langle C_i, UC_j, u_{ij} \rangle$$

where:

- C represents the *Context*, i.e. the current state variables characterizing the system behavior with its given environment; then, C_i is the i th element of this list of context.
- UC stands for the type of the control action as defined in STAMP; we assume there are 6 types as described below.
- u corresponds to the textual description of the hazard of the concerned unsafe control action; i, j is for the position of the cell in the table.

An illustration of STPA table structure is shown in table 1, where $n > m$.

	UC ₁	UC ₂	UC ₃	UC ₄
C ₁	u_{11}	u_{12}	u_{13}	u_{14}
.	.	.	.	.
C _n	u_{n1}	u_{n2}	u_{n3}	u_{n4}
.	.	.	.	.
C _m	u_{m1}	u_{m2}	u_{m3}	u_{m4}

Table 1 – *Unsafe Control Actions* table

On the one hand, this UCA table structure implicitly reveals a time characteristic for a control action (noted ca , later on). Let be $t0$ the starting time whose discrete value belongs to $ok, +, -, \infty$, ok is the appropriate time, $+$ too late time, $-$ too early, and ∞ for absence of ca . Similarly, td the duration whose value belongs to $ok, +, -, \infty$, ok is the appropriate duration, $+$ too long, and $-$ too short.

On the other hand, the types of UCA 3 and 4 are split hereafter, since their description states two distinct features. Therefore, the type rearrangement is given as follows:

- UC_1 : for providing ca which is inappropriate, noted $uca(t0 = ok, td = ok)$.
- UC_2 : for absence of ca , noted $ca(t0 = \infty, td = ok)$.
- UC_3 : for providing ca too early, noted $ca(t0 = -, td = ok)$.
- UC_4 : for providing ca too late, noted $ca(t0 = +, td = ok)$.
- UC_5 : for stopping ca too soon, noted $ca(t0 = ok, td = -)$.
- UC_6 : for a long duration of ca , noted $ca(t0 = ok, td = +)$.

Contrary to the UCA types, the *Context* relies on actual data extracting from aircraft actual behavior. To be relevant, these data are given by actual records of several flights, in approach phase for our study case. The process using this data base is described hereafter.

Figure 2 explains the proecess of our study.




Figure 2 – Methodology

Our proposed methodology deals with studying a very critical phase of a flight, e.g. approach phase. This methodology consists of several steps depicted as follows:

Step1 : To build an initial STPA table in order to obtain control actions.

Step2 : To collect data in order to understand how pilot actually perform successful approaches. To do this, ADS-B was used.

Step3 : To develop and use a tool that takes current position of the aircraft and improves STPA analysis in order to list unsafe control actions that a pilot might give.

As far as the prediction of UCA is concerned, STPA table and the ADS-B data base are necessary for the tool to be developed, however the performance of the prediction would actually be improved if we are able to add a model of pilot tasks, which reduces the number of possible irrelevant unsafe control actions. For multiple failure, we assume for instance that an UCA_4 can not be immediately followed by an UCA_3 , thus, the time analysis is taken into account (Bruggemann & Campbell 2017).

The next section shows an ideal pilot task model that we would like to generate automatically from the STPA table, ADS-B and official procedures.

4 MODELLING PILOT TASK BEHAVIOUR

The first part of the research deals with modeling the behavior of pilot in response to tasks that he/she has to perform. To be able to do that the available manuscripts that aid pilot in training and subsequently performing certain tasks, e.g., FCTM, FCOM, and SOPs are used. (To be noted that these are not the official documents from aircraft manufacturers but the ones available online. ref: www.airbusdriver.net) Since our study is based on one of the most critical phase of flight, i.e., approach and landing, we will, for the moment, look only at those actions that will be performed during this phase. Figure 3 gives an idea of the task performed during approach phase.




Figure 3 – Approach Procedure

These tasks are to be performed by the pilots at certain altitude, speed and at required distance from the Touch Down Zone. It can be seen that these tasks correspond to some actions that the pilots have to perform. Each time they perform these tasks they need to make certain decisions based on current state of the aircraft, environmental conditions and other external factors (like Air Traffic Controllers instruc-

curve doesn't represent the actual position of the aircraft. It shows the trends in altitude and speed. Some sudden spikes and drops in the curves arise mainly due to missing data or some changes that occur due to operational reasons like extension of landing gears, etc.

6 INTRODUCTION TO THE TOOL

The authors decided to develop a tool that can automatically perform the analysis. MATLAB based GUIDE (Graphical User Interface Development Environment) is used to build this tool. The tool takes ADS-B data as the input and predicts unsafe control actions. It also plots an altitude vs speed diagram of the approach in order to compare it to safe approach patterns. Figure 7 shows the layout of the tool. It has a mode selection switch that decides whether data will be taken automatically or must be entered manually. There is an input box that allows data to be entered manually. The output box presents results from the analysis. And the nominal performance curve plots the fitted curve based on the data points that are input.




Figure 7 – Screenshot of the Tool

The tool carries out following tasks.

- Taking position, speed and heading values from ADS-B receiver and importing it in a .csv file (done in "Automatic" mode). This can also be input manually by selecting "Manual" from the Mode Selection Switch.
- Plot a nominal approach Altitude vs. Speed curve for a particular aircraft type and a particular airport. It is done in the "Nominal Performance Curve".
- Based on the values of Altitude and Speed assume which step of procedure the pilot will perform next. Compare the current action to actions in

future and list down possible unsafe control actions in the output box.

In order to performance the analysis following steps are performed:

- Define the nominal approach curve based on the values obtained from ADS-B data.
- Select a point for which we want to study the scenario, or perform our analysis. This is crucial as the aircraft is constantly moving instead of performing the analysis every second it might be interesting to do it over a time zone for which the conditions remain same, and change it over to the next zone as soon as it passes to the next scenario.
- We use data from the aircraft to obtain a safety margin. This is obtained by plotting all the safe landings over a period of time and then based on extreme points making a safe envelope.
- Calculate the distance of our selected point from the safety margin.
- Based on this distance define the context for unsafe control action (e.g., Low/high speed (if the speed difference is too much) and same for altitude). It is done by obtaining the factor (altitude or speed) that is farthest from the safe margin and use that as "critical" because it will be difficult to achieve.

- Based on the context and current position populate the list of unsafe control action on the tool.

7 RESULTS

Once all the Unsafe Control Actions were defined, they were entered in the tool for analysis of an aircraft in real time. The tool provides us with results in the output box in $uca_{ij} = \langle C_i, UC_j, u_{ij} \rangle$ format. For example in Figure 8, based on current altitude and speed performing the next control action will result in stall due to increase drag. Here the context is low speed and the corresponding hazard is Stall.




Figure 8 – An output on the Tool

It can be seen that the safety margin is obtained as an envelope and is presented in dotted lines in Figure 9.




Figure 9 – Safety Margin

8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE

This tool was necessary to better visualize the study for ourselves and to be able to distribute as a stand-alone application to Engineers and pilots to collect data and have their feedback. As mentioned the tool is in the preliminary stage although it can perform some analysis at this level too. A mid-term progress would be to perform some real time tests on simulator to evaluate the performance of the tool and to improve it. At present a safety margin has been obtained and the tool can base its analysis on this safety margin. However, as part of current work, machine learning is being introduced in order to have a safety envelope that is more accurate. Machine Learning/Neural Networks can also be implemented to automatically select a context based on the position of the aircraft, pilot's previous actions, and the environment in real time (wind, etc..). This tool will also be proposed to a discussion with pilot's and have their feedback. This is also very important in order to validate the tool.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The ongoing research is being funded by Dassault Aviation. The project is under the ISAE-SUPAERO and Dassault Aviation chaire.

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